British & American old documents about Persia

    British & American old documents About Persia
  اوضاع ایران از دیدگاه مقامات رسمی دو کشور انگلیس و آمریکا در اوایل قرن نوزدهم میلادی


PERSIA

[43849]        No. 3.
Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey .—(Received December 15.)
(No. 438.)
(Telegraphic.)   P.  Tehran, December 15, 1908.
APPOINTMENT of Firman Firma to Governorship of Fars. Your telegram No. 352 of yesterday.
Firman Firma's record in 1906 was, it is true, not good, but he has improved. His appointment appears to me to offer the best chance of relative order being restored in the province, and there is no stronger man now available for the appointment.
Firman Firma would be acceptable locally. The present condition of the trade routes is almost impossible owing to robberies, and the Governor is a failure.
I had pressed Firman Firma to accept the appointment, which I understood had been offered to him, before receiving your telegram, I also assured him of full support if he governed well.

*              *         *


PERSIA

[43420]        No. 3.
Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey .—(Received December 12)
(No. 432.)
(Telegraphic.)   P.                                        Tehran, December 15, 1908.
          I am replying to your dispatch No. 27 commercial by bag.
          Since the dismissal of Zil-es- Sultan from the Governorship of Fars the insecurity of the southern roads has been increasing. This is due to the weakness of the present Governor General.
The danger to travelers and the grave prejudice to trade consequent upon this state of affairs have been the subject of repeated representations to the Persian Government, and I am now urging that the Governor generalship of Fars may be given to Firman Firma.

*          *          *         

April 12, 1913
          The new post master recently arrived from Isfahan has stated that all posts for the East of Persia will be handed to Nayeb Hussein's sowars stationed at Natanz and carried by them through to Naien where they will be handed to the post master and whence the mail from the East of Persia will be carried to Natanz and thence to ardestan insted of as formerly via isfahan.


 Was dispatched to the locality and attacked and routed the insurgents
The peace has not been broken on the Afghan borders, although there were disquieting signs of activity across the frontier, and some private raiding into Seistan in Chakansur region had to be countered.
No unusual incidents have been reported from the central and southern provinces. The attitude of Mashallah Khan, the ex-Rebel of Kashan, has been unsatisfactory for some time past, and coercive measures were contemplated, but he has now notified his intention to comply with the orders sent to him to appear in Tehran.
The Bakhtiari chiefs, in a recent conference at Ispahan, re-elected Sardar Zafar as Ilkhani and Sardar Asbja as llbegi for the current year.
The South Persia Rifles columns employed in the Isfahan operations are now returning to their stations in Shiraz and Kerman. A detachment of South Persia-Rifles has been stationed on the Bushire road with headquarters at Bushire.rived from Isfahan has stated that all posts for the East of Persia will be handed to Naib Hussein’s Sowars stationed at Natanz and carried by them through to Nain where they will be handed to the post Master and whence the mails from the East of Persia will be carried to Natanz and thence to Ardistan instead of as formerly via Isfahan.

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Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey. (Received June 22, 12'25p.m.)
Tehran, June 21, 1914.
No.183       
(June 22, 9 a.m.)
          MY telegram No. 181
          Although not authorized to do so, I deemed it advisable to warn Minister for Foreign Affairs last night of the fact that, unless the Persian Government could guarantee the regular payment of gendarmerie budget, there is a grave danger that the Swedish Mission will be recalled. I told his Excellency very confidentially of the step the Swedish Government appeared disposed to take in this direction.
           Minister for Foreign Affairs was much disturbed, and said he had strongly urged the Cabinet to grant the Kerman mining concession in order to secure funds for the immediate requirements of the gendarmerie, but that certain Ministers hesitated, although Ala-es-Sultaneh and Arfa-ed-Dowleh supported him. I replied that His Majesty's Government was not disposed to furnish further funds, as it did not appear sufficiently well established that the Persian Government had really done their utmost to make proper provision for the financial needs of this most essential force.
           In reply to a question from his Excellency as to whether, if the Kerman concession were granted. I could hold out any hopes of the long- anticipated large loan being forthcoming. I replied that this would only be possible in the event of Persia accepting a Commission of Control, which would supervise both the collection and the distribution of revenue. I did not know, I added, if the money would be forthcoming even under such conditions.
   Minister for Foreign Affairs then asked whether I had had any reply about the question of leasing the islands in the Gulf. I replied in the affirmative, and said that the most His Majesty's Government could offer would be 25,000(Pounds Sterling). For Kishm, Henjam, Larak, Hormuz, and Shekh Shuaibi .
          His Excellency's face fell, and he exclaimed that this would mean little more than the islands produce at present, and that he believed that an offer of 1,000,000 Pound. To buy Hormuz alone from a British syndicate had already been refused. I replied that the syndicate would have lost money, since I understood that oxide mines only produced about 11, 000 pound sterling. A year, of which 75 per cent, goes to the Persian Government, and that the supply is probably not inexhaustible.
          It is not clear from the telegram from Government of India what value is placed on the islands, but it appears to me evident that nothing under 100.000 Pounds. Per annum would tempt the Persian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would submit the matter to his colleagues, but felt convinced that the proposal would not be listened to.   He seemed to be very disappointed.
(Addressed to Foreign Office ; sent to India.)

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This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.
ARCHIVES.
PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.      
CONFIDENTIAL.
[49732]        No. 1.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.
          Petrograd, September 15, 1914.
YOUR telegram No. 736 of 12th September: Persian gendarmerie.
          I spoke this morning to Minister for foreign Affair as instructed.
His Excellency said that he. Knew nothing about Nayeb Hussein and reported offer of Russian protection of life and property.
          On my dwelling on the importance of maintaining an efficient gendarmerie for preservation of order so long as war lasted his Excellency said he entirely concurred, provided that we did not ask him to provide money necessary for its upkeep.  He would, he said, discuss various questions to which I had called his attention with M. de Klemm, and let me know his views later.
[2251 q-1]
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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government]
Archives
Persia and Central Asia.  
Confidential.
[51980]        No. 1.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, (Received September 22.)
(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic,)   It.                             Petrograd, September 22, 1914.
MY telegram No. 413 of 15th September: Persian gendarmerie.
Russian Government state that they have no intention of protecting Naib Hussein. Moreover, the latter, though formerly guilty of acts of brigandage, had for two years not only given no cause for complaints in thin respect, but had even, in conjunction with his son, greatly contributed to the maintenance of order on Tehran-Isfahan road, they had given Imperial Government no reason for anticipating a return to his former lawless pursuits.
As regards gendarmerie, Imperial Government consider its utility is incontestable, and they have already offered to help Persian Government, on far from onerous terms, a loan of 300,000 tomans for its upkeep, an offer which has not yet been accepted. Russian Government add that in present circumstances it would hardly be possible to advance a larger sum.
[2251 v—5]
*        *        *
The war
CONFIDENTIAL. [18581]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley,
(No. 48.)
{Telegraphic.)       Foreign Office, February 18, 1915.
MY telegram No. 45 of 10th February: Persian neutrality.
         It has been suggested that, in return for neutrality of Persia and suppression of Jihad, His Majesty's Government, should give to Persian Government an undertaking to following effect:
British troops shall be withdrawn from Ahwaz as soon as retirement of Turkish troops and cessation of Jihad admit of this.
His Majesty's Government will devote all their influence in Irak to the maintenance of Shiah Governors at Kerbela and Nejef, to the reduction of heavy quarantine impositions on corpses, and the abolition of taxes on pilgrims.
His Majesty's Government will grant large loan on security of islands in Persian Gulf without other interest than the average revenue of these islands.
        I have mentioned these proposals to M. de Etter.
   Please telegraph your views as to possible effect of this proposed offer on Persian Government.
(Repeated to Petrograd, No. 247.)
   
*        *        *
ARCHIVES,
THE WAR.
CONFIDENTIAL.         
[48239]                                              No.1.
Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.  
(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic)         Tehran. April, 22, 1915.
BASRA telegram no. S94 B of 19th April.
          Suggestions as to reasons to be held out to Ulema have already been dealt with in Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 74 of 21st February, and cooling off of Jihad movement In Arabistan and Irak seems to prove their influence in our favor is producing results. Leading clergy here are in touch with us and are working in direction we desire, but their local influence would certainly be impaired if it were publicly known that we are using them.
          In my opinion these inducements are superfluous, and possibly injurious if addressed to Ulema, while, if made public, I would point out that enemy can also hold out similar inducements and with weighty effect, as it is generally anticipated here that Germany will win.
          As regards inducements to Persian Government as distinct from Ulema, the undertaking in 1907 to "respect" the integrity, &c, of Persia has become mere byword here, and I fear that a guarantee to "maintain" Persian integrity, even if France were included in declaration, would fall flat.
          Present Government will do nothing effectual without financial support, and, I fear, but little, even if we gave it. It is deplorably weak and disunited, and its only merit is its readiness to resign. I think we ought to work for the formation of a stronger Cabinet, if possible under Ain-ed-Dowleh. He is the best, perhaps the only, man in Persia capable of dealing with German agitators, whose activity is increasing. Russian Legation will accept him, and I hope Russian Government will not insist on Saad-ed-Dowleh, who, though capable and resolute, has no prestige and following in the country possessed by Ain-ed-Dowleh.
(Confidential.)
          Russian Charge d'Affaires seems to be quite ready to agree, but is naturally disinclined to take action which would commit M. de Etter, who arrives in a week. I think, however, that time is of first importance.
          I think we should have to support new Ministry financially by agreeing to suspend interest, which, after all, is scarcely more than making a virtue of necessity, as it is tolerably certain that Persia will be able to pay but a fraction of what is due.
          Recent reports represent Swedish officers as more pro-German than ever, and Persian Government appears to have little control over them.
(Repeated to Petrograd and Basra.)    
*        *        *
January, 1915
Pro-Turkish movements in Qum and Kashan, Mashallah Khan offers his services to Persian Government for War.
(Mashallah Khan sends a telegram to central Government offering voluntarily his support to fight against any enmy of Iran. with his three thousand fighting men. While other tribe's Khans such as Bakhtiari promised their support to the British only. Even against)

*        *        *

NEWS No. 18 FOR THE WEEK ENDING 2nd May 1915.
Summary 
CONDITION OF TOWN AND ENVIRONS.
Undercurrent of agitation continues,
26 April. Meeting of Clergy in Masjid Shah.
Sheikh Hadi & Sheikh Reza arrived from Najaf with "Ahkam".
   Governor General calls on Haji Agha Nouruilah. Differences arranged.
1 st .May. Meeting of (Clergy at Takht i Pulad).    Sharif ul Vaezin arrives from Kashan. 6 April.
Fireworks for opening of Medjliss. 
8 May. Bazaar looking askance on notes of Imperial Bank. Muttamid i Khakhan and Haji Seyyid Habibulah appointed Deputies. Democrats purchasing arms.
Price, stationery.
Wheat Krs. 90-106 & Barley Krs. 45 per Kharvar,
Wheat Bread Krs.1.80 per shah man. Environs reported unsafe.
*        *        *

Archives
THE WAR.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[57023]
No. I.
Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)
(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic)         Tehran, May 8, 1915.
MY telegram No. 180 of 4th May.
          Russian Minister informs me dispatch of troops is very doubtful, as Viceroy of Caucasus has expressed himself unable to spare any.
          Position here, always precarious, thus becomes critical. Germans, by further expenditure, by playing on Persian prejudices, viz., hatred of Russia, mistrust of ourselves and Islamic sentiments, &c, by lying reports of German and Turkish victories, and by exploiting difficulties of Imperial Bank of Persia, have entirely captivated public opinion in the capital. In fact, press, Parliament, [? everybody] are with them.   They possess arms and are enlisting recruits.
          In Shiraz, Isfahan, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Kermanshah same conditions prevail in different degrees.
          All their preparations point to concerted plan to attack us, and I expect attempt will not be long deferred. Ministers, though we have made them understand what ultimate result for Persia will be, are themselves somewhat impressed by German action, and they are unquestionably afraid to act against very powerful pro-German sentiments of Tehran. Moreover, they have no force to rely on except police, and are practically powerless.
          Russian, French, and Belgian Ministers agree with me that immediate dispatch of troops to Enzeli is the only chance of restoring situation, and it may even now be too late, as Germans, conscious that cause in Europe is lost, will stop at nothing. What form attack will take I cannot say. Germans are so completely masters of the situation here that violence is unnecessary, but it may be different in the provinces.
(Sent to India, Petrograd, Basra, Bushire, Shiraz, and Isfahan.)

[2416 h—6]
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American Legation
Tehran, Persia

"Translation from the Star of Persia"                                         September 28  1917:
                                   Farman  Farma and the South Persia Rifles.

          Farman Farma and the South Persia Rifles affect Persia and the Persian like Cancer which if not cut away as soon as possible will affect the whole Country and community and will become  so chronic that there will be no way to cure it, and any powerful government that might hereafter Wish to erase this blot from the face of Persia would encounter the greatest difficulties  From the day Vassough-ed-Dowleh's Cabinet appointed Farman  Farma as governor of Fars and from the minute he permitted General Sykes to organize this band, those who were aware of it knew that Fars would become like fire, the flame of which would burn Persia .to the heart.
         The former conduct, reputation and record of Farman Farma are so black that nobody believes he will shrink from doing anything the enemy asks.

         Farman Farma is not like others, who only sell their native country when they are asked by foreigners, but he is so willing and glad to see his native country under the control of the enemy that he himself invites them and suggests to and teaches them unlawful things.
         Farman Farma considers it a great honor to see the English flag hoisted before his eyes and would be delighted to have the English proclaim their ownership of Persia in his presence before his death, for it has been his most earnest desire to throw Persia into the mouth of the dragon of the world.
         Farman Farma is ready to do any dirty work in order to be honored by England and receive a decoration or recognition, and never cares to feel that he is the representative of a government which is worth more than thousands of such decorations that any enemy of his native country might bestow upon him.

       The English consider' the South Persia Rifles  the permission to organize which  was given by Vassough-ed-Ddwleh with the assistance of Farman Farma, as a strong and necessary organization and they believe that Persia belongs to these two men, one of whom has given the permission while the other executes, the orders.
        But the people of Persia have never given away their birthright simplify for the Wish of two persons, and consider. The South Persia Rifles, which- is. The cause of the trouble in Fars, under. The: care of Farman Farma and a number of English officers, as the worst organization yet founded by
England Who is a liar .in saying that she is the protector of weak nations.
        The agents of this same England have been buying and storing all the food - staff. They are able to get
in different parts  of the South;   Wherever the English- Officers arrive the prevailing  good order is taken away. In all the different parts of the south the South Persia Rifles have caused such a panic that no one there considers his life and his goods as his own.
       We do not know what is the real claim of the English men? If they say they organized the south Persia Rifle for lack of safety and to maintain order, we reply that nobody ever heard or read of so" much disorder" in Fars as there has been since the time they organized the South Persia Rifles.   If they have some other idea they should send their officers and ammunition to keep India and leave us to ourselves.
         If England is true in saying that she is the protector of weak nations and does not mean to deceive the world she had better withdraw the South Persia Rifles and the army of her Russian ally from Persia and leave Persia, which has sustained not only untold hardships but also losses which mount into the millions during its neutrality at the hands of the allies, to itself.
         To our idea it is the greatest duty of the Cabinet to urgently ask the evacuation of Persia by both the Russian and the English armies and to discharge Farman Farma, who holds his position only through the support of the English, and appoint some good Persian in his place.   If the South Persia Rifles and Farman Farma be not put aside before the opening of the Medjliss their existence will cause another Coup d'Etats.   
         On account of the scarcity of wheat most of the bakeries in Hamadan are closed and bread is very-difficult", to obtain. Sardar Akram sent some five thousand khavars (about one thousand six hundred tons) of wheat for Hamadan but while it was en route a Russian officer with four hundred Russian soldiers confiscated the wheat for army purposes, cut the. Telegraph wires and are causing great unsafety on the roads of Malayer, Sultanatabad and Broojerd.          
              At the request of the Ministry of the Interior the Minister of foreign Affairs has renewed the' contracts of all the Swedes now employed by the Persian Government as police and gendarmerie officers.

*          *          *

 CONFIDENTIAL.         Section 2.
  [1234101    No. 1.

P. Cox to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 1.)
(No. 130.)
My Lord,     Tehran, August 11, 1919.
I HAVE the honor to forward the enclosed Tehran Intelligence Summary, No. 26 I for period ending the 31st July, 1919.
I have, &c.
P. Z. COX.
Enclosure in No. 1. Tehran Intelligence Summary, No. 26, for Period ending July 31, 1919.
Political Situation.
HIS Imperial Majesty the Shah proposes to visit Europe this autumn. Arrangements are now being made for the journey; but the date of his departure from Tehran and the details of the "tour have not yet been definitely settled.
The recent arrival of His Imperial Highness the Valiahed from Tabriz is accepted as an indication that he will represent the Shah during the absence of His Imperial Majesty.
In connection with the British peace celebrations, His Britannic Majesty's Minister entertained the heads of the British community at dinner on the 23rd July, and held an evening reception which was attended by members of the Imperial family, by the Persian and Allied Ministers, and by a great number of Persian officials and notables and Allied residents. The weather was favorable for the display of fireworks and illuminations prepared for the occasion.
Prince Salar-el-Lashkar, who has been Governor-General at Kermanshah, with success, for some time past, has been- recalled to Tehran for other work.
The pay of many Government administrations is two or three mouths in arrears. Provincial revenues are not coming in, and the advances obtained from the British Government are absorbed in military expenditure.
In Gilan a serious Jungali rising was attempted early in July in the district of Enzeli. A detachment of Cossacks was dispatched to the locality and attacked and routed the insurgents’.
[793 a- -2] 
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PERSIA No. 1 (1919).
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN: 
HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT.
SIGNED AT TEHRAN, AUGUST 9, 1919.
Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

LONDON:
               
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.
To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFIIJE at the following addresses: Imperial House, Kincsway, London, W.C. 2, and 28, Abingdon Street, London, S.W. 1; 37, Pktkh Street, Manchester ; 1, St. Andrew's Crkscknt, Cardiff ; 23, Forth Street, Edinburoh; or iroia E. PONSONBY, Ltd., 116. Grafton Street, Dublin.
1919 
Agreement between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Persian Government. Signed at Tehran, August 9, 1919.
NO. 1
Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and Persia.
        PREAMBLE : In virtue of the close ties of friendship which have existed between the two Governments in the past, and in the conviction that it is in the essential and mutual interests of both in future that these ties should be cemented, and that the progress and prosperity of Persia should be promoted to the utmost, it is hereby agreed between the Persian Government on the one hand, and His Britannic Majesty's Minister, acting on behalf of his Government, on the other, as follows : 1- The British Government reiterate, in the most' categorical manner, the undertakings which they have repeatedly given in the past to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia.
The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, the. Services of whatever expert advisers may, after consultation between the two Governments, be considered necessary for the several departments of the Persian Administration. These advisers shall be engaged on contracts and endowed with adequate powers, the nature of which shall be the matter of agreement between the Persian Government and the advisers:
The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, such officers and such munitions and equipment of modern type as may be adjudged necessary by a joint commission of military experts, British and Persian, which shall assemble forthwith for the purpose of estimating the needs of Persia in respect of the formation of a uniform force which the Persian Government proposes to create for the establishment and preservation of order in the country and on its frontiers.
For the purpose of financing the reforms indicated in clauses 2 and 3 of this agreement, the British Government offer to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the Persian Government, for which adequate security shall be sought by the two Governments in consultation in the revenues of the customs or other sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government. Pending the completion of negotiations for such a loan the British Government will supply on account of it such funds as may be necessary for initiating the said reforms.
The British Government fully recognizing the urgent need which exists for the improvement of communications in Persia, with a view both to the extension of trade and the prevention of famine, are prepared to co-operate with the Persian Government for the encouragement of Anglo-Persian enterprise in this direction, both by means of railway construction and other forms of transport , subject always to the examination of the problems by experts and to agreement between the two Governments as to the particular projects which may be most necessary, practicable, and profitable.
0. The two Governments agree to the appointment forthwith of a joint Committee of experts for the examination and revision of the existing Customs Tariff with: I view to its reconstruction on a basis calculated to accord with the legitimate interests of the country and to promote its prosperity.
Signed at Tehran, August 9, 1919.

  No. 2
Agreement relating to Loan of 2,000,000L, at 7 per cent., redeemable in
Twenty Years.
        PREAMBLE: Contract between the British Government and the Persia Government with reference to an agreement concluded this; day between the said Governments.   It is agreed as follows
        Article 1. The British Government grant a loan of 2,000,000L. Sterling to the Persian at such dates as may be indicated by the Persian Government after the British Financial Adviser shall have taken up the duties of his office at Tehran, as provided for in the aforesaid agreement.
      Art. 2. The Persian Government undertakes to pay interest monthly at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum upon sums advanced in accordance with article 1 up to 20th March, 1921, and thereafter to pay monthly-such amount as will suffice to liquidate the principal sum and interest thereon at 7 per cent, per annum in twenty years.
      Art. 3. All the revenues and Customs receipts assigned in virtue of the contract of the 8th May, 1911,* for the repayment of the loan of l, 250,000L are assigned for the repayment of the present loan with continuity of all conditions stipulated in the said contract, and with priority over all debts other than the 1911 loan and subsequent advances made by the British Government. In case of insufficiency of the receipts indicated above the Persian Government undertakes to make good the necessary sums from other resources, and for this purpose the Persian Government hereby assigns to the service of the present loan, and of the other advances above mentioned, in priority and with continuity of conditions stipulated in the aforesaid contract, the Customs receipts of all other regions, is so far as these receipts are or shall be at its disposal.
      Art. 4. The Persian Government will have the right of repayment of the present loan at any date out of the proceeds of any British loan which it may contract for.
Signed at Tehran, August 9, 1919. 
No. 3.
Article 5 of Contract between the Persian Government and the Imperial Bank of Persia relating to Persian Government Five per Cent. Loan of 1,250,000L. Of May 8, 1911.
                        (Included for reference.)
5.     THE Imperial Government of Persia specially assigns to the service of the loan, and as a first charge thereon, subject only to prior charges amounting to 15,7142. 1s. 10d. Per annum for three years, and 30,2782. 12s. Id. per annum from the year 1913 to the year 1928. The full net customs receipts of every description which the Government now is, or at any time hereafter may he, entitled to collect and receive at all ports or places in the Persian Gulf, including Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Mohammereh, and Ahwaz, which receipts are hereby made payable to the Bank, and the Imperial Government of Persia hereby engages forthwith after receipt thereof to pay to the Bank all such Customs receipts as aforesaid without deduction other than for actual expenses of administration of the customs of the said ports disbursed prior to the date of such payment.
(a)   The Imperial Government of Persia undertakes that throughout the continuance of the loan all sums collected by the Customs Administration shall be paid to the Bank at the ports of collection, or at its nearest branch, week by week for meeting the prior charges referred to above and for the service of the loan, and an account of such receipts shall be- submitted to the Persian Government by the Bank at the end of each mouth.
(b) The bank shall, out of the moneys so collected, pay the prior charges above-mentioned, and the interest and sinking fund of the loan, and shall hold the surplus at the disposal of the Imperial Government of Persia.
(c) The bank undertakes, out of the moneys so received, to pay on behalf of the Imperial Government of Persia the half-yearly coupon in Loudon, and supervise the working of the sinking fund and service of the loan free of charges connected with the same.
(d.)    In the event of the Customs receipts of the above-mentioned ports for any three mouths falling short of the amount required for the prior charges and the service of the loan, either for interest or amortization, the Imperial Government of Persia binds itself to make good such deficiency from other sources of Government revenue, and. further, should receipts from these sources fall below the amount required as above, the Persian Government hereby assignment for this purpose the revenue derived from the receipts of the telegraphs—this assignment to constitute a second charge on the said telegraph receipts up to the year 1923, after which the telegraph receipts will be free.

                                                          No. 4.

Sir P. Cox to His Highness Vossug-ed-Dowleh.
Your Highness,   British Legation, Tehran, August 9, 1919.
        I TRUST your Highness has been able, during your successful direction of affairs-of the Persian State, to convince yourself that His Britannic Majesty's Government have always endeavored to support to the utmost the efforts of your Highness Cabinet on the one hand to restore order and security in the interior of the country, and on the other to maintain a policy of close co-operation, between the Persian and British Governments.
        As further evidence of the goodwill by which the Cabinet of London is inspired, I am now authorized to inform your Highness that, in the event of the agreement regarding projects of reforms which your Government contemplates introducing in Persia being concluded, His Britannic Majesty's Government will be prepared in due course to co-operate with the Persian Government with a view to the realization of the following desiderata:
The revision of the treaties actually in force between the two Powers.
The claim of Persia to compensation for material damage suffered at the hands of other belligerents.
The rectification of the frontier of Persia at the points where it is agreed upon by the parties to be justifiable.
        The precise manner, time and means to be chosen for pursuing these aims shall be discussed, as soon as practicable, by the two Governments.
                           I have, &c. (Signed)      P. Z. COX.

No. 5.
Sir P. Cox to His Highness Vossug-ed-Dowleh.
Your Highness,               British Legation, Tehran, August 9, 1919.
WITH reference to the second desideratum indicated in my previous letter of to-day's date, it is understood and agreed between the two Governments reciprocally that, on the one hand His Majesty's Government will not claim from the Government of His Majesty the Shah the cost of the maintenance of British troops which His Majesty's Government were obliged to send to Persia owing to Persia's want of power to defend her neutrality, and that on the other hand the Persian Government will not claim from the British Government an indemnity for any damage which may have been caused by the said troops during their presence in Persian territory.
It is to be understood, however, that this agreement of the two parties does not in any way affect the claims of individuals and private institutions, which will be dealt with independently.
A note from your Highness informing me that you accept this position on behalf of the Persian Government will suffice to record the agreement of the two Governments on this subject.
I have, &c. (Signed)      P. Z. COX.

*     *     *

Printed for the war cabinet. August 1919
SECRET.
The report of Lord Curzon to the House of Lords
PERSIAN AGREEMENT.

       MY colleagues may have noticed for many months past a series of telegrams passing between the Foreign Office and our representative in Tehran, concerning a contemplated agreement with, the Persian Government. These negotiations commenced, here at a time when the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet, was in charge. Of this branch of our foreign policy, and Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, the Secretary of State for India, and the Treasury were from the start cognizant of these negotiations. In their final form they have had the approval of Mr. Montagu and Mr. Chamberlain here and of Mr. Balfour in Paris, I now submit to the Cabinet a brief resume of the transactions that have led to what I venture to regard as a most satisfactory result.       
          At the outbreak of the war the situation in Persia was somewhat as follows: Our own hands were tied by the unfortunate Anglo-Russian Agreement- of 1907, which, although it was entered into by the then Government with the object of bringing, to an end friction between Russia and ourselves in Persia and ensuring the  stability of Persian institutions, had throughout been regarded with intense hostility by, the Persian Government, and had in practice been used as an instrument, for tightening the Russian grip upon the northern part of the country. The consequence was that when hostilities began and Russia and we were allies in a common cause, the ill - feeling generated in Persia by Russian conduct was passed on to ourselves. We were thought to be identified with Russian policy and to be hostile to all Persian aspirations, and the sympathies of the country in the early stages of the war were unmistakably on the side of the Central Powers. Though Persia remained nominally neutral, she lent what aid she could to enemy activity and intrigue; and the situation in the country, arising partly from German propaganda, partly from Turkish invasion, and partly from the hostility of the native Government, became so acute that, for the defense of the Afghan border, of our own interests in the country, and of the interests of the Entente, we were compelled to treat Persia almost as a theatre of war.
          Violent outbreaks occurred in the southern part of the country, where a native force, entitled the South Persia Rifles, had been organized under British officers as a sort of gendarmerie to keep the trade routes open and to maintain the peace. At one time this force and its British officers were in great danger, and had to be reinforced by troops from India. On the eastern side of the country active steps were necessary to preserve the integrity of the Afghan border. After the Russian revolution, there was the threat of a Bolshevik invasion in the north. Meanwhile, on the north-west, while the Turks and Germans were in undisputed occupation of the Caucasus, they threatened a descent upon the Persian frontier province of Azerbaijan, which at one moment placed the capital in danger and almost led to the flight of the Persian Government. In order to prevent this eruption, to maintain our position in the Caspian region, and to prevent the Germans from obtaining access by way of that sea to Asia, we were obliged to push forward a strong military force from the direction of Bagdad. British troops still occupy the line from Bagdad to Kazvin, although it is hoped that they may be withdrawn at no distant date.
          The whole of these military operations, which involved considerable peril and a great outlay, have been more than justified by the results. Persia has been freed from the enemy and tranquillized. The fact that we have no hostile intentions against the country or its Government is now thoroughly known. It only remains for us to construct a policy which will stabilize conditions in the future.
          A year ago, when our fortunes in the western theatre of operations were drawing towards a successful issue, and when Persia herself had ceased to contemplate a German victory, a leading Persian statesman named Vossug-ed- Dowleh, who had always been friendly to British interests, was appointed by the Shah as the head of the Ministry With him in the Persian Cabinet were two other Ministers equally convinced that the future of Persia lay in friendly reliance upon ourselves The Shah himself adopted the same line and backed his  Ministers. Simultaneously we had sent to Tehran as our Minister Sir Percy Cox, for many years British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and latterly chief political officer in Mesopotamia. His object and his instructions were to come to some arrangement with the Persian Government by which British interests in that part of the world should be safeguarded in future from a recurrence of the recent shocks, and by which Persia, incurably feeble and unable to stand by herself, should be given the support that would enable her to maintain her position among the independent nations of the world. The negotiations which have proceeded during the last nine months, and which have now reached a satisfactory conclusion, are the result of the joint efforts of the Persian Government and Sir Percy Cox.
          What they mean in practice is this : Not that we have received or are about to receive a mandate for Persia—on the contrary, the attempts of the Persian representatives in Paris to be heard by the Peace Conference have been attended by uniform failure ; not that Persia has handed over to us any part of her liberties ; not that we are assuming fresh and costly obligations which will place a great strain upon us in the future ; but that the Persian Government, realizing that we are the only neighboring Great Power closely interested in the fate of Persia, able and willing to help her, and likely to be disinterested in that object, have decided of their own free will to ask us to assist Persia in the rehabilitation of her fortunes.
If it be asked why we should undertake the task at all, and why Persia should not be left to herself and allowed to rot into picturesque decay, the answer is that her geographical position, the magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future safety of our Eastern Empire render it impossible for us now—just as it would have been impossible for us at any time during the past fifty years—to. Disinterest ourselves from what happens in Persia. Moreover, now that we are about to assume the mandate for Mesopotamia, which will make us coterminous with the western frontiers of Persia, we cannot permit the existence, between the frontiers of our Indian Empire  in Baluchistan and those of our new Protectorate, of a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos, and political disorder. Further. If Persia were to be left alone there is every reason to fear that she would soon be overrun by Bolshevik! Influences from the north. Lastly, we possess in the south-western corner, of Persia great, assets in the shape of the oilfields, which are worked for the British Navy and which give us a commanding interest in that part of the world.
          In these circumstances, the desire of the Foreign Office and India Office in combination has been to make an arrangement by which, without assuming a direct control over Persian administration or involving ourselves in continued financial responsibilities on a large scale, we should yet be able to provide Persia with the expert assistance and advice which will enable the State to be rebuilt.
          Under the terms of the agreement which has now been negotiated, we undertake to supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, such expert advisers as may be considered necessary for the various branches of the Persian Administration. Amongst other things, the Persian Government desire to establish a uniform force, into, which shall be incorporated all the various elements—Persian regulars and gendarmerie, the Cossack Brigade, the South Persia Rifles, &c.—which have hitherto existed in various parts of the country. We propose to lend such officers as may be required to organize this force. Further, the Treasury has agreed to make an advance to the Persian Government of 2,000,000 L to be shared equally by the Government of India and the Treasury, and to be secured upon the Persian customs revenues, in order to allow the Persian Government to initiate the reforms which are in contemplation. It is formally stipulated that the first installment of this shall not be paid until the British financial adviser has assumed his duties. In the remaining parts of the agreement will be found various provisions which will enable us to back the Persian Government in realizing, several of their unsatisfied claims.
          The upshot of these arrangements is, not that Persia will be converted in any sense into a British Protectorate: on the contrary, the first article of the agreement pledges His Majesty's Government to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of the country ; but that the reign of foreign intrigue and of jealous competition between rival Powers, with the consequent disorganization in Persia, will be, if we are successful, brought to an end, and that Persia herself, if she plays the game, will have the best chance of recuperation that she has enjoyed at any time during the past century. Finally, this agreement, if satisfactorily carried out, will be a valuable guarantee for the future peace of the Eastern world.
          The Shah of Persia, who has throughout participated in and favored these negotiations, is about to visit this country as a proof of his goodwill; and the publication to the world of the agreement which I have here described will, I hope, be regarded as a convincing testimony that, the relations of the two Countries, so long and closely interconnected, will be placed henceforward on a sounder and surer basis.           
Foreign Office, August 9, 1919.
*        *        *
The Nation                                         August 23, 1919

Politics and Affairs.

A BRITISH PERSIA.
 If ever the eventful period through which we are passing finds an adequately human historian, his record of the obstinate vitality of the faith of mankind will make moving reading.  Half his story will be of the inadequacy of statesmen, the cynicism of governments, and the collapse of great ideals in the Peace Treaties and the Covenant   of   the   League of Nations.    But against  this,   if  he  is  truthful,  he  will  set the  fact that millions of unhappy men did believe with passionate fervor   in   the   dawn   of   a   new   age,   and acted on  their belief.     He will record how the enemy capitulated in firm faith in a Wilson peace according to the Fourteen Points.   He will describe that amazing General Election in Ireland in which Sinn Fein swept up the votes of the Irish race for its policy of an appeal to the Peace Conference and the conscience of Europe. He will record the gathering at Paris of all the halt and the maimed among the nations, and the waiting of their delegates in Paris round this Diplomatic Pool of Siloam for the miracle of the moving of the waters that never came.   In retrospect the surprising thing will not be the victory of the strong over the weak, and the suppression of every cry that might have troubled the victors: it will be the stirring of this sudden belief in the power of right and the efficacy of an ideal. Posterity will   be   very curious about   the personality   of this President Wilson whoso words had such force, that precisely those races on the earth who know most intimately what it means to feel the hand of irresistible power at their throat, were the first to imagine that in this assembly of mankind the voice of the despised would be heard, and great Empires shrink before the conscience of civilization.
Diplomacy has its conventions which admirably serve the needs of the strong in such an emergency. It is not wonderful that Ireland and Egypt got no hearing: they are not Sovereign States: they have no juridical personality of which the law will take cognizance, the case of Persia was much more delicate.   Again and again her sovereign independence had been fully recognized. She had been allowed a seat in the Hague Conferences, perhaps because Russia reckoned her vote with that of Montenegro among her satellites.   She actually figures in the Covenant of the League in the most honorable position among its original members, and the American Senator may possibly be right who suggests that the reason for this distinction is that Persia's vote can now be reckoned among the group which will necessarily follow British leadership. Formally, then, as a Sovereign State and a Member of the League, Persia had every right to be heard. She had a strong case to plead. Like Belgium, she also had seen her territory abused and her neutrality violated, first by Russian and then by Turkish armies, and of these the latter (if not both) had massacred her people and devastated her land.   She was entitled to reparation, and she needed every sort of help, from the guidance of foreign experts to the lending of money, in order to reconstruct her shattered fortunes.
Diplomatically her status clearly called for review. Since 1907 she had lived under the shadow of the Anglo-Russian Convention, which divided her territory, parceled out for economic opportunities between her two great neighbors, and regulated her freedom of renounced her privileges under this convention, and it had lapsed in consequence, for Persia herself had never been a party to it.    What now would be her destiny? The epoch of condominium was over, yet Persia, as a result of the war and the trampling of rival armies across her soil, was less than ever able to stand without some help. Must she then become absolutely the protected satellite of Great Britain?  That, with Russia a casualty, and with British army's actually in occupation of her territory, might have seemed the inevitable solution. But the Persians had heard of Mr. Wilson.  They had read, not only in his speeches, but in those of Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey, of the new epoch in which the weakest State would enjoy the same rights as the greatest. They actually   dared   to   hope   that   this   subversive, this almost Bolshevik doctrine, might have some application to their case. They wanted the help of expert Europeans to bring order to their finances and to reconstruct/their dilapidated system of administration, but they dreaded the old system by which Russian or British-nominees 11 were forced upon them.    They gratefully remembered the American Mr. Shuster, who had come among them by their own invitation, served them without interested purpose as their devoted official, and worked miracles during the few months that the Russians allowed him to remain at his post.    Perhaps they might have equal luck again: in any event they wished to be free to go at their own choice to one Western State or another, to borrow financial or educational or military exports. If they were really Members of the League, equal through need, follows with the greatest Powers in this society, ought it not to help them to find the kind of experts that they required, and also perhaps to secure the necessary credits ! We remember a recent speech in which Lord Grey laid stress on precisely this function as one of the most important aspects of the League.
It turned out otherwise. The Persian Mission, luckier than some others, did indeed roach Paris safely.  Month after month went by, however, and it found that the doors of the Big Four were always barred. It could talk to journalists.    It got a ticket for the hall of Mirrors.  But never did it see before it even the faintest prospect of an audience with the dictators of civilization.    The Shah and his Government waited, and when they had waited nine months, their faith gave out. They bowed to the inevitable and they concluded with the British Government the Treaty, which it had all along intended to impose.  We do not feel disposed to argue over its nature. The Foreign Office announces that it does not amount to anything like a protectorate: in such apologies the Foreign Office is much less clever than it is in the maneuvers which really interest it. It knows the sort of House of Commons to which it speaks. The Treaty, as we read it places Persia in the same position towards this Empire that Egypt occupied before 1914.    We do indeed pledge ourselves to recognize its independence, much as we had pledged ourselves to evacuate Egypt.    It is independence qualified by the fact that we alone are to appoint the “advisers" who will control its policy, and we alone are to appoint the officers who command the forces which will execute the “advice."
To be sure, diplomacy, which rarely forgets the dictates of good manners, affects in the Treaty to regard these appointments as the result of discussions between, the Persians and ourselves. We however, shall discuss with our troops on Persian soil, with the keys of the world's Council Chamber in our hands, and the financial assets of Persia already mortgaged to us.  Persia is tied to us, fatally and completely.  If in a moment ^desperation she were to bethink herself of turning to some other Power for aid, she would find herself in a hopeless cul - de -sac. This Treaty is primarily an advertisement to all other Powers, great and small, that Persia is our sphere.  This Moab is our wash-pot; over Edom have we cash our shoe.     No other Power can trespass without committing an unfriendly act.  And if, to consider every hypothesis, some other Power were to trespass, with what resources could she go to work? We have a lien on the customs.   We acquire by this Treaty the rights of railway building and control the alternative means of transport also.   We already had the oil-fields, Persia, in short, has placed all her assets in our hands. We can perceive only one respect in which this regime differs from an avowed protectorate.   The disguise (such as it is) will enable the Foreign Office to escape the inquisition (such as it is) of the House of Commons.
Two consequences follow from this over-smart performance.  The French are exceedingly annoyed. They have never hitherto displayed much interest in Persia, though they may have felt flattered by the wish of the Persians (which we have vetoed) to engage French educational experts. It is hard to believe that "pertinax " and the" Temps " are really distressed by this outrage on a little nationality—though to be sure we all have a surprising capacity of sympathy for the victims of our rivals. It may be, of course, that the French are somewhat perturbed by the possible consequences of so many wounds dealt to Moslem pride.   They have taken Morocco and Tunis, and they want to take Syria.  We have made the Sultan of Turkey our prisoner, and the King of the Hedjaz, the prospective Caliph, is our creature. And now as a climax we extinguish what was left of the independence of the last Mohammedan State. On the whole, however, we imagine that the French press is retaliating against us for our supposed reluctance to carry out the Secret Treaty which makes over Syria to France. Our troops still hold it.  We are supplying arms to the Arab Prince Feisal, backing his claims to Damascus, and also arguing for the maximum extension of the Jewish "national home" in Palestine.    Our experts (while taking Mesopotamia and Egypt for ourselves) talk Arab nationalism, when the French press their claims. They even hint broadly, and probably truly, that outside the Lebanon no one wants to see French rule in Syria. Inevitably comes the retort that the Persians no more   desire our protection than the Syrians call for the French.
This quarrel, we imagine, will be settled on the usual diplomatic principle that two wrongs make a right. It is known technically as the doctrine of compensations.   The French will grow callous about Persia, when we cease   to deplore the hard fate of Syria.
The other consequence of this transaction will be more enduring.   It has exposed the vanity of the hopes, or shall we say, of some of the hopes, that were reposed in the League of Nations.    If we can, without consulting the rest of the civilized world, assign this great region, with its high though fatally impractical civilization, if we can   escape in Persia even the few limitation! implied in a formal " Mandate," if we can shut the door of the World's Court to any weak suitor whose case runs counter to our interests, we have succeeded in demonstrating that the critics are deplorably right who  say that the League of Nations means nothing but the consecrate hegemony of three or four Great Powers. We, by self-interest, the Americans by weakness and incapacity, are destroying the ideal for which both profess to have fought.   From crisis to crisis, always in Russia, lately in Hungary, and now in Persia, idealist repeat the warning yet hopeful phrase, “The League of Nations is passing through a test."   It takes a series of tests to extinguish so great a hope.   There will come a moment?   Will no longer indulge it.

*        *        *

The Admiralty, Whitehall, London. S.W.1 
19th October 1919.
             Sir,
          With reference to Foreign office letter of the 24th September to Sir P.Cox, N0. 194 (Persian Confidential 1:33304), in which mention was made of the desirability of maintaining British Officers and crews in the Caspian, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that there are at the present time plenty of Officers and men to spare from the Royal Navy, and, in Their Lordships' opinion, these could not be better employed than in consolidating the British position in Persia.
          2.  It may not be desired to show the British Flag again on the Caspian, but, in view of possible future developments, that sea should not be allowed to become again a purely Russian lake, and the best way to prevent this would be by assisting a Persian Marine both Government and Mercantile.
          3.  It is suggested that, in the first place, it should be ascertained definitely what Officers and men are required and on what terms. It will then be possible to call for volunteers.

*        *        *

Foreign Office
October 30th 1919
145x12/e/34.
Sir.
            In reply to your letter of the 24th Instant, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herein an order £5660.7.6.       on the Paymaster General for Five thousand, six  hundred and sixty pounds, seven shillings and six pence to be placed to the credit of Prince Nosret~ed~Dowleh in a special account In the same way as the first payment for which an order was enclosed in my letter No. 135586 of the 8th instant.
                        I am.
                                    Sir,
                                                            Your most obedient
                                                                            Humble Servant,
                                                                                        The Manager,
   The Imperial Bank of Persia,
   25 Abchurch Lane. E. C.
*          *          *

Confidential                 
Extract from, the ^“Times" of Monday, November 3, 1919.

The Shah's Visit to the City, Saturday, November, 1, 1919.

Lord Curzon's Speech.
LORD CURZON, in supporting the toast, said he was proud on behalf of the government to accept the invitation which had been entrusted to him by the Lord Mayor.    It was only the previous day that His Majesty the Shah landed for the time on our shores.   Arriving in London, he received the welcome to which he is entitled in the streets, and at Buckingham Palace in the evening he was addressed in language of extreme felicity by the King.    That day his Imperial Majesty had received the welcome in this historic hall, as his forebears had done for him, of the Corporation of London.   (Applause.)   His Majesty, although young in years, was already old on the Throne.    He had occupied the Throne of Persia for more than ten years, and during the more recent years of his reign, in which he had enjoyed executive authority, he had already shown gifts of character intelligence which promised well for his future career.
          After referring to the visits of former Shahs and recalling that, as an Eton boy between forty and fifty years ago, he stood in the crowd on the station at Windsor to shout himself hoarse on the arrival of his Imperial Majesty's great and grandfather, Lord Curzon said that in the fullness of time His Majesty had come to this country, for the first time, but not by any means, they hoped, the last (cheers), to establish contact with Western civilization and manners, and to learn with what good sentiments of regard we appreciated him and his country.   The Lord Mayor stated some reasons for which we Englishmen regarded Persia with special interest, and had told them that Persia was a country that had produced famous Poets, illustrious kings, a country whose literature and culture had exercised a profound influence on the East.    That was a truism.              He (Lord Curzon) ventured to say that the connection between our country and Persia was based upon much more than culture or sentiment or romance.    It was based upon a profound and lasting community of interests a community of interests that arose from our graphical position in relation to each other, and he spoke now of the Indian Empire as part of Great Britain.    Our mutual relations of trade and commerce, identity of our political interests, produced a warm and lasting mutual regard, one other thing let them remember about Persia.    Through all these centuries of vicissitudes and romance, Persia had always retained a national spirit unquenched by adversity and a political identity which no vicissitudes could submerge.
The Anglo- Persian agreement.
          And now in the fullness of time our Government had concluded this agreement which the Lord Mayor had referred.   What did we desire to do by that agreement?  We wished to assist His Majesty and his Government in the restoration of peace and order to his country, sadly vexed and agitated by the disturbance of the recent war.   We wished to assist him in developing the resources of his native land.    Those resources were indeed considerable; resources both above and below soil.   They were the resources of trade and the resources of a naturally industrious and capable population.   What Persia wanted at the present time was security of her frontiers to prevent them being crossed by any foe; and internally, order and law, the authority of His Majesty to be felt in every quarter of his country; pacification of the trade routes along which she carries goods in exchange for produce with foreign lands. In this respect land transport and communication was lamentably difficult.     Then there was the administration of justice for her people and, above all
( which was the secret of all successful administration); a sound and economic finance.
            If  His Majesty's Government with our friendly assistance could develop the resources to which he had referred, Persia had a great future before her. (Cheers.) Her trade could develop and her soil could be made to sustain a much larger population than at present.    There was no reason why Persia should not recover a great and resounding position as one of the independent Musulman nations of the world. The object of the present Government as it was the object of every patriotic Englishman was to assist Persia in the maintenance of her independence and integrity, and to render easy the execution of the task.   I recall and I see it blazoned on one of the flags at the end of this hall the national emblem of Persia. It is the Lion and the Sun.    May we not find in that juxtaposition, concluded Lord Curzon,    a happy omen; The British Lion stands forth as the proud and valiant champion of the rights and liberties of Persia.    Over his shoulders rises the orb of the steadily increasing progress and prosperity of Persia itself." (Cheers.)

                     *        *        *

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRIME INISTER        
                                                                (June 6, 1921)
Compatriots :                                                                                             At a time when our dear homeland is confronted with countless difficulties, the necessity to resist the same on the one hand and initiate improvements on the other, invited me and. my honorable collaborators to assume, by order of His Imperial Majesty, the reins of the Government.
It is but too evident that in acceptance such heavy responsibility, I depend on the gracious solicitude and patronage of His Imperial Majesty, on the pure and immaculate conscience of the benevolent masses of the nation who will study the situation, follow and aid the plans of the Government to make social improvements and economic developments.
The startling and historic events which mark the past and especially the present, have made this fact clear that the prosperity of any nation is proportionate to the devotion and patriotism of its individuals.   And in any country. Where these feelings are more intense and their effects more conspicuous, that country’s success, powers and independence are more substantial and respected.            Dear Compatriots!
Persia, your fatherland whose historic honor and credit need no description, has long since been, on account of divers tragic happenings, divested of what her splendor and greatness deserved.   Our negligence in the past has been the sole cause of the disastrous difficulties and dangers of the present.    But as the past experience serves as a lesson for the future, I hope that through. Providential blessing, Imperial good will, and courageous sacrifice of my fellow countrymen, the errors of the past will be mended, and the prosperity which we have hoped for since the constitution will be ours. Especially since sincere and friendly relations have been maintained between His Majesty's Government and the great neighboring powers.    Therefore it is hoped that the 'Government will, with due regard to its neutrality, confidently equip itself to realize domestic efforts.
One of the most important questions which the present Government intends to attend to is the prompt convocation the Mejliss (National Assembly).   The Government desires to confirm its reformatory views with the harmony and co-operation of the honorable deputies of the Mejliss, and to frame necessary rules and regulations for a sound administration of the state.    Inasmuch as the recruitment of the militia is essential to the vitality, thrift, order, and independence of the country, the first principle of the Government will be to increase the comfort and expand the organizations of the Army.
 Considering the Government's purpose to ameliorate the social state Of the nation, and since heed lessness in agricultural matters and failure to facilitate the moans of transportation, construction of roads, exploitation of natural resources, preparation of employment for the unoccupied, have been the fundamental cause of the general destitution of peasants and laborers who comprise the majority of the population, the present Government contemplates:
(1) Promoting Agriculture in the hands of technical exports, augmenting the incomes of the laborers and peasants, mitigating their living conditions, and ameliorating the relations between farmers and landholders.
(2)As the Russian. Bank with all its branches has been
Transferred to, the Persian Government Cabinet has decided to procure from internal source sufficient capital to establish its branches in all districts and provinces.
          (3)     Corporations with proper safeguards for the interests of laborers, so that occupation may be found for the unemployed.
(4)               Preparing the basis for a domestic loan to procure sufficient funds to organize necessary institutions.
         (5)   Preliminary and most essential to the above plans, are the reduction and cancellation of all unnecessary expenses;  abstention from extravagant outlay additional to the Budget which will be within a fixed and limited standard; maintenance of fiscal equilibrium by increasing the revenues, making good for the deficit of the Budget by means of domestic loans.
(6) Dissemination of culture also comprises one of the principal projects of the Government. In addition to the expenses the Government will bear for this purpose, the well-to-do will be called upon to assist. Because the achievement of this end will place them under such obligations as to ne­cessitate their pecuniary aid.
In view of the fact that one of the main intent­ions of the Cabinet is reforming the departments of Justice and abrogating the capitulations, it will therefore make every effort to perfect the state of the judicial affairs of the country.
Establishment of sanitary institutions in all districts and provinces, in the interest of the peasants who have so far been suffering from the lack of sanitary means.
These are the fundamental views of the Government which are hoped to be executed under the guidance of His Imperial Majesty and with the aid of our honorable compatriots.
          In spite of the complete confidence I have in my enlightened compatriots, in case anyone is found to be intriguing or endeavoring to neutralize the aforesaid policies of the Government, I will be forced to prosecute and punish the offenders.

                                                   Ghavamo-s-Saltaneh,
                                                            Prime Minister. 

*        *        * 
                                                Tehran
                                                August 12, 1920
The Honorable
The Secretary of State, Washington.
Sir:
Referring to the legation's dispatch No. 239 of August 13, I have the honor to advise the Department that quite unexpectedly the Shah has ordered the Crown Prince not to proceed to Azerbaijan.    The reason for this change of mind is the Shah's timidity to oppose the Minister of War who was not in favor of having the province of Azerbaijan taken out of the hands of the military.
In a private conference with the Crown Prince several days ago, he told me of the humiliations to which the royal family is being constantly subjected by the Minister of War.   The Shah is convinced that the latter is doing everything within his power to undermine the throne and make himself a dictator.   The Minister of War being in complete control of the army, the Shah feels that this is not the time for the measuring of strength.
                                I have the Honor to be
                                                                         Sir,
                                                           Your obedient servant

*        *        *
Persia.
          The Manchester Guardian of August 16, in discussing the terms of Anglo Persian Agreement, says:-
          To begin with we pledge ourselves in the strongest terms “to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia," but as we have done the same thing several times before with the final results of   the 1907 Agreement, this by itself will hardly give great comfort to the Persian Government. Still, there can be no doubt that this does really represent alike the policy and the interest of this country, and therefore, in the absence of any strong temptation to the contrary, we shall certainly respect our undertaking.
Its conclusion is:—
          Everything depends on the spirit in which such an agreement is worked. Honestly and honorably worked, with some approach to a disinterested regard for Persian interests and the growth of the spirit of independence in Persia, it may prove the beginning of a new and better era for a once great people. It will be for public men and for the people at large here to see that this is done. But it will need all our vigilance and all our goodwill.
          The Morning Post of August 19 thus views the position: — one has only to look at a map of the Middle East to see the vital .importance of Persia to the British Empire.     A weak Persia, a prey to internal anarchy and defenseless against machinations from without, is a standing danger to the security of India.   The part which was allotted to Persia in Turku-German designs is well known, and although these ambitious schemes have now been frustrated, there remains the Bolshevist danger. It would have been shear madness on the part of Great Britain had she failed to respond to the overtures from Teheran.   She is, further, the only Allied Power which marched with Persia, and were her policy not dictated to her by urgent strategic necessity -she is manifestly the Power whose mission it must be to extend a helping hand to Persia and assist her to the prosperity which her natural resources entitle her.
          In commenting on the same subject, The Times of August 16 says that England seeks neither territory nor exclusive influence in the lands of the Shah.
In that disinterested spirit, the present agreement has been framed. When the Shah and his Ministers saw that the ultimate victory of the Allies was assured, they recalled memories of the past close friendship of their country with Great Britain, and made overtures, to which there was a ready response. Sir Percy Cox, who possesses a long and intimate acquaintance with Persian questions, was sent to Teheran, and under his discreet guidance the new Agreement was framed.
          The broad attitude of England towards Persia is thus summarized:
The wish of the British Government is that Persia shall stand on her own feet, and with the aid now given to her she should be able to reorganize her Administration.  The revived friendship between the two countries will be exemplified by the visit which the young Shah is about to pay to these islands. The Agreement has the full support of the Persian Government, and without the cordial aid of leading Minister at Teheran it could never have been concluded. The regeneration of Persia really rests, in the last resort, with the Persians themselves. They have now a renewed opportunity to show their capacity for enlightened government. If they cease from internal strife and purge their Departments of corruption, the Agreement should help to produce a definite stabilization of the Middle East, of which the Kingdom of Persia is the core. The only part of the Agreement which we regard with misgiving is the reference to railway construction. Persia's first need is roads, not railways. Her population is too scanty and her resources too few to permit large railway schemes. On the other hand, there never was a country more admirably suited for a widespread system of motor transport, and we trust roads and motor vehicles will be given the foremost place in any programmed of internal development. 
*        *        *

Translation of letter of Vossogh ud Dowleh to Sir P. Cox.
October 8th 1919.
Your Excellency,
In view of the appreciation by the Imperial Persian Government and its special gratitude for friendship shown, at different times, by H.B.H's Government towards that of Persia, and since the latter has made efforts to perfect and consolidate friendly relations in the mutual interests of the two governments, and now that the weighty speech of Lord Curzon, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, prepares ground for further and more definite proof of the good will of the British Government towards that of Persia, I consider it my duty to express, in the name of the Imperial Persian Government, ray pleasure and to offer my thanks, with the same Sincerity as Lord Curzon displayed in his admirable speech.
At a banquet given on the 18th September last in honor of Prince Nosrat- ud- Dowleh, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon had expressed a sound opinion on the special and traditional relations existing between the two countries, their mutual interests, the importance of the position of Persia in Asia and the obligations which these considerations impose upon the British Government to help Persia.   In the clearest language His Lordship had explained the principals of the integrity, full independence and the liberty of Persia in its international relations and explained how the agreement of August 9th, 1919 was in accord with those principles. (His Lordship had further explained) that there is nothing in the spirit of the agreement which  would curtail the sovereign rights, or/full liberty of Persia, or world in any way be contrary to the relations between these two governments and other nations. Lord Curzon considers the liberty and the authority of Persia to be the bulwark of the peace of Asia and even that of the world.   He considers this point essential in British interests. To dispel any doubt in this matter he gives one to understand that British assistance, in giving experts for the military and financial organization and for the improvement and establishment of the means of communication, is for the purpose of strengthening the authority of the Persian Government under the above mentioned principles. He also gives an explicit undertaking as to the support the British Government will afford to Persia in putting her claims forward at the Peace Conference in Paris.
Although the above statements are not new to me and up to the present the real friendship existing between the two governments has had no other objects, still, in view of the recent agreement and the different constructions put on it, and also in view of the fact that the above statements explain and strengthen the former guarantees, the speech has been received and noted with the seriousness which becomes such important and formal utterances.
I do not need to repeat that in admitting the mutual and indisputable interests of the two States the Persian Government consider the principles put forward by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs the best and firmest basis of relations between the two governments.
I .feel confident that with good will on the part of the two parties in carrying out the stipulations of the agreement in question Persia will, in the near future, with the mental help of the able experts, who enter the service  of   the Persian  government with the object making useful plans of administrations and instructing
the Persian departments in new and beneficial principles, succeed in introducing due reforms and acquire such power as will enable her to preserve her high historical and geographical position and to be more useful to Great Britain by reason of her sincere friendship.
In requesting Your Excellency to be good enough to communicate the above to your Government I avail etc.
(Sd)     Vossogh ud Dowleh.
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The Nation
Saturday, August 23, 1919
                While our troops occupy Persia and controls the entire administration, a Treaty has been dictated to the Shah's Government which, .in effect reduces Persia to the level of Egypt.  We are to supply the “advisers” who will reconstruct the administration, and the officers who will re-organize and command the Army.   We are also to construct the railways, and the loan of £2,000,000 at 7 per cent, which we allot to Persia will^ be, secured on the customs receipts.   The tariff is to be remodeled: it had been, dictated by Russia, and was unfavorable to British trade.   In short we seem to succeed to the authority   and the assets which hitherto had been divided between Russia and ourselves.   We repeat once more the old pledge to respect Persia's independence. This Treaty has caused a great outcry in the French Press, which justly points out it is dead against the-spirit of the of the League of Nations. The Persian Mission in Paris was refused all access to the Big Four until this Treaty had been concluded in Teheran.  The real reason for French indignation is apparently that while we our-selves ride roughshod over Persia, we are said to be placing obstacles in the way of  France's acquisition of a  " mandate " in Syria   Certainly a Government which treats Persia in this way deprives  itself of any moral right to vindicate Syrian nationalism  against French Imperialism.
( Under the original copy a person unknown has written by hand:
" All this savors Mirza Hussein Khan who was with Mushaver in Paris and is now in London.)
{The Nation was a newspaper in India}

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Foreign Office
October 30th 1919
145x12/e/34.
Sir
            In reply to your letter of the 24th Instant, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herein an order £5660.7.6.       on the Paymaster General for Five thousand, six  hundred and sixty pounds, seven shillings and six pence to be placed to the credit of Prince Nosret~ed~Dowleh in a special account In the same way as the first payment for which an order was enclosed in my letter No. 135586 of the 8th instant.
                        I am.
                                    Sir,
                                    Your most obedient
                                             Humble Servant,
                                                                  The Manager,
   The Imperial BanK of Perrsia,
   25 Abchurch Lane. E. C.

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                                                Tehran
                                                August 12, 1920
The Honorable
The Secretary of State, Washington.
Sir:
Referring to the legation's dispatch No. 239 of August 13, I have the honor to advise the Department that quite unexpectedly the Shah has ordered the Crown Prince not to proceed to Azarbaiejan.    The reason for this change of mind is the Shah's timidity to oppose the Minister of War who was not in favor of having the province of Azerbaiejan taken out of the hands of the military.
In a private conference with the Crown Prince several days ago, he told me of the humiliations to which the royal family is being constantly subjected by the Minister of War.   The Shah is convinced that the latter is doing everything within his power to undermine the throne and make himself a dictator.   The Minister of War being in complete control of the army, the Shah feels that this is not the time for the measuring of strength.
                                I have the Honor to be
                                                              Sir,                                                                                               Your   obedient servant

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PROCLAMATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER                     (June 6, 1921)

Compatriots:        
        At a time when our dear homeland is confronted with countless difficulties, the necessity to resist the same on the one hand and initiate improvements on the other, invited me and. my honorable collaborators to assume, by order of His Imperial Majesty, the reins of the Government.
It is but too evident that in acceptance such heavy responsibility, I depend on the gracious solicitude and patronage of His Imperial Majesty, on the pure and immaculate conscience of the benevolent masses of the nation who will study the situation, follow and aid the plans of the Government to make social improvements and economic developments.
The startling and historic events which mark the past and especially the present, have made this fact clear that the prosperity of any nation is proportionate to the devotion and patriotism of its individuals.   And in any country. Where these feelings are more intense and their effects more conspicuous, that country’s success, powers and independence are more substantial and respected.     Dear Compatriots!
Persia, your fatherland whose historic honor and credit need no description, has long since been, on account of divers tragic happenings, divested of what her splendor and greatness deserved.   Our negligence in the past has been the sole cause of the disastrous difficulties and dangers of the present.    But as the past experience serves as a lesson for the future, I hope that through. Providential blessing, Imperial good will, and courageous sacrifice of my fellow countrymen, the errors of the past will be mended, and the prosperity which we have hoped for since the constitution will be ours. Especially since sincere and friendly relations have been maintained between His Majesty's Government and the great neighboring powers.    Therefore it is hoped that the 'Government will, with due regard to its neutrality, confidently equip itself to realize domestic efforts.
One of the most important questions which the present Government intends to attend to is the prompt convocation the Mejliss (National Assembly).   The Government desires to confirm its reformatory views with the harmony and co-operation of the honorable deputies of the Mejliss, and to frame necessary rules and regulations for a sound administration of the state.    Inasmuch as the recruitment of the militia is essential to the vitality, thrift, order, and independence of the country, the first principle of the Government will be to increase the comfort and expand the organizations of the Army.
 Considering the Government's purpose to ameliorate the social state Of the nation, and since heed lessness in agricultural matters and failure to facilitate the moans of transportation, construction of roads, exploitation of natural resources, preparation of employment for the unoccupied, have been the fundamental cause of the general destitution of peasants and laborers who comprise the majority of the population, the present Government contemplates:
(1) Promoting Agriculture in the hands of technical exports, augmenting the incomes of the laborers and peasants, mitigating their living conditions, and ameliorating the relations between farmers and landholders.
(2} As the Russian. Bank with all its branches has been transferred to, the Persian Government, the Cabinet has decided to procure from internal source sufficient capital to establish its branches in all districts and provinces.
(3) Exploitation of all mines and other resources through public corporations with proper safeguards for the interests of laborers, so that occupation may be found for the unemployed.
 (4)    Preparing the basis for a domestic loan to procure sufficient funds to organize necessary institutions.
 (5)  Preliminary and most essential to the above plans, are the reduction and cancellation of all unnecessary expenses;  abstention from extravagant outlay additional to the Budget which will be within a fixed and limited standard; maintenance of fiscal equilibrium by increasing the revenues, making good for the deficit of the Budget by means of domestic loans.
(6)     Dissemination of culture also comprises one of the principal projects of the Government. In addition to the expenses the Government will bear for this purpose, the well-to-do will be called upon to assist. Because the achievement of this end will place them under such obligations as to ne­cessitate their pecuniary aid.   (7)     In view of the fact that one of the main intent­ions of the Cabinet is reforming the departments of Justice and abrogating the capitulations, it will therefore make every effort to perfect the state of the judicial affairs of the country.           (8)     Establishment of sanitary institutions in all districts and provinces, in the interest of the peasants who have so far been suffering from the lack of sanitary means.
These are the fundamental views of the Government which are hoped to be executed under the guidance of His Imperial Majesty and with the aid of our honorable compatriots.
          In spite of the complete confidence I have in my enlightened compatriots, in case anyone is found to be intriguing or endeavoring to neutralize the aforesaid policies of the Government, I will be forced to prosecute and punish the of­fenders.

                                                                   Ghavamo-s-Saltaneh,
                                                                             Prime Minister.

*        *        *
13 October 1923
          On Saturday afternoon October 13, I was informed by a reliable source that the Minister of war has been using every possible pressure to have himself appointed Prime Minister in the event   of the fall the Moshir- ed- Dowleh Government.
          Just now there are only three men who alternate in this office, Mostofi- ol- Mamalek, Moshir- ed- Doleh, and Ghavm- os- Saltaneh. As for Moshir-od-Dowleh, the least intimidation from the Minister of war would cause him to resign. 

{At that crucial time only 3 men were considered capable to take the primership position in Iran. But Moshir- ed- Doleh is such a weak person with the slightest intimidations tends to resign.}